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straighten themselves up, after all.
…
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what was going on here
must make way to
those who know little.
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And finally as little as nothing.
In the grass that has overgrown
causes and effects,
someone must be stretched out,
blade of grass in his mouth,
gazing at the clouds.”
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ABSTRACT
One of the most certain facts about conflicts is uncertainty about
facts. To establish the truth and find out what really happened, the
international community has been sending fact-finding missions to
conflict areas around the world. These missions have been designed
to produce legal reports, based on binary legal dichotomies. This
article builds on social psychology studies to argue that these
missions’ reliance on abstract and adversarial legal norms triggers
backlash and rejection of factual findings by the perpetrators’
societies. Instead of agreeing on a simple set of brute facts, such as
the number of fatalities, or concrete causes of death, the focus of
attention is shifted to abstract legal norms and to the threat they pose
to collective beliefs and identities. Focusing on the U.N. Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict as a case study, this article
demonstrates how international efforts to provide conflicting societies
with new, credible facts may instead end up intensifying the conflict
over ‘what happened.’ Particularly, the article sheds light on several
contemporary challenges to international fact-finding, including their
factual contingency, their ambiguous goals and flawed institutional
design processes, and their dissemination deficit.
Based on an interdisciplinary normative framework and
empirical analysis of the Goldstone Mission, the article suggests a
new framework to design international fact-finding missions. First,
the concept of truth should not be associated exclusively with legal
truth, and facts should not be interpreted and evaluated based solely
on legal categorization and interpretation; second, long-term goals
should be carefully clarified, prioritized, and tailored to the concrete
social circumstances; third, fact-finding processes should be matched
with the mission’s core goal, with a special attention given to
institutional structures, participation, and social legitimacy. Finally,
in this era of constant challenges to knowledge and information,
where ‘alternative facts’ are frequently produced to counter
unwelcomed information, and when critical findings are denounced
as ‘fake news’, international fact-finding missions should be sensitive
to the various contingencies of their findings, and adopt a humbler
approach concerning the ‘indisputable’ nature of these findings. By
reimagining international fact-finding and rethinking their design
processes, International fact-finding missions may contribute to
dissemination of threatening information during intractable conflicts
in a way which is unattainable by existing legal institutions.

2018]

DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING

339

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................338
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................340
II. INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING: CONTEMPORARY
CHALLENGES .......................................................................343
A. Factual Contingency ...........................................................345
B. Goal Ambiguity ..................................................................349
C. Dissemination of Information .............................................351
III. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO
INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING DURING
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS...............................................353
A. Social Identities ..................................................................355
B. Societal Beliefs, Collective Memory, and Ethos of
Conflict ..............................................................................356
C. Dissemination of Information and the Dynamic of
Threatened National Identities ..........................................357
D. What’s Law Got To Do With It? ........................................359
IV. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO THE
DISSEMINATION OF THE GOLDSTONE REPORT..........361
A. Resistance to Facts Relating to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict Within the Jewish-Israeli Society........................361
B. Historical Background and the Creation of the
Goldstone Mission ............................................................362
C. The Immediate Aftermath of the Release of the
Goldstone Report ..............................................................364
D. National Identity, Social Bias and the Goldstone Report ...365
V. REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING .............368
A. Prioritizing Fact-Finding Goals and Purposes ....................369
1. Immediate Goal: Finding the Truth...............................369
2. Long Term Goals: Accountability versus Conflict
Resolution ...................................................................371
3. Institutional goals: reputation, legitimacy, and
compliance ..................................................................373
B. Matching goals with processes in international factfinding ...............................................................................376
VI. CONCLUSION............................................................................379

340

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:337

I. INTRODUCTION
How many Palestinian civilians were killed during Operation
Cast Lead? Was the killing of twenty-one family members at the AlSamouni house an intentional targeting of civilians, or an unfortunate
mistake based on erroneous intelligence? Were war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by Israel or Hamas (or both) during these
twenty-two days in December 2008 and January 2009? These and
many other questions concerning Operation Cast Lead have troubled
many organizations and individuals around the world. Amnesty
International urged the international community to intervene, 1 Israeli
human rights organizations called on the Israeli Government to halt
the threat to civilians in Gaza, 2 and various international
organizations pressed the Security Council to ‘take action.’ 3
The United Nations (“UN”) Human Rights Council decided to
intervene: on January 12, 2009, while hostilities were still ongoing in
Gaza, it established the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict (hereinafter the Goldstone Mission) to investigate violations
of international law. 4 After months of intensive work collecting
evidence and hearing testimonies, the Goldstone Mission issued a
detailed 452-page report. 5 After recounting ‘factual findings,’ the
1. Amnesty International Calls for an Immediate Humanitarian Truce in Gaza, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 7, 2009), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/01/amnestyinternational-calls-immediate-humanitarian-truce-gaza-20090107/
[https://perma.cc/87X5H52Y] (archived Dec. 31, 2017); End Unlawful Attacks and Meet Gaza’s Emergency Needs,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 29, 2008), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news
/2008/12/end-unlawful-attacks-and-meet-gaza039s-emergency-needs-20081229/
[https://perma.cc/PD9U-CYH8] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
2. Donald Macintyre, Civilian Casualties: Human Rights Groups Accuse Israelis of War
Crimes, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/civilian-casualties-human-rights-groups-accuse-israelis-of-war-crimes-1366727.html
[https://perma.cc/LL6W-YASN] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
3. Press Release, Press Conference by Humanitarian, Human Rights Organizations on
Gaza, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/090107_
Humanitarian.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/XN3C-CD9V] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
4. The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Particularly Due to the Recent Israeli Military Attacks against the Occupied Gaza Strip,
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-9/L.1 (Jan. 12 2009), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G09/102/84/PDF/G0910284.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/6CMS-FQHA] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
5. Report of the Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied
Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,
U.N.
Doc.
A/HRC/12/48
(Sept.
25,
2009),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ5Q-S95E] (archived
Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter the Goldstone Report].
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Report further described the Mission’s ‘legal findings,’ and concluded
that some of the actions of the Government of Israel and of the
Palestinian armed groups constitute war crimes and may amount to
crimes against humanity. 6
The Jewish-Israeli public rejected the Report altogether as biased
and unfounded. 7 The Israeli Government contested the Report’s
findings and issued its own alternative reports. 8 The facts produced by
the Israeli counter-reports stood in stark contradiction to the facts
established by the Goldstone Report. 9 Consequently, the Goldstone
Report became, in itself, a part of the conflict. 10 Soon enough, the
Report sparked another debate concerning the legal standards to be
applied by international fact-finding missions. 11 But in spite of all the
attention and the resources invested, and almost a decade later, to this
6. Id. at 284, 417-19.
7. An Israeli public opinion poll found that among Jewish-Israelis that were familiar with
the report’s main conclusion, an overwhelming majority (93.5%) believed that the report was
biased against Israel; and 79% rejected the finding that IDF soldiers committed war crimes.
Data and questionnaires courtesy of the Guttman Center for Surveys at the Israel Democracy
Institute (RA) and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution at Tel Aviv
University. See EPHRAIM YAAR & TAMAR HERMANN, WAR AND PEACE INDEX - SEPTEMBER
2009 1 (2009), http://www.peaceindex.org/files/peaceindex2009_9_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9PQ9-WHRC] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
8. Initial Response to Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza Established Pursuant
to Resolution S-9/1 of the Human Rights Council, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Sept. 24, 2009) http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/Goldstone
ReportInitialResponse240909.pdf; Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, ISRAELI
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 29, 2010), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics
/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NPG-JJBB] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
9. With regard to several incidents described in the Goldstone Mission, the Israeli
counter-report contained an opposing factual description of the events, specifically concerning
the identification of various targets as military or civilian targets, the munition used, and the
intent or knowledge of the commanders in the field. Compare Goldstone Report, supra note 5,
at 199-201, and Israeli counter-report, supra note 8, at 41-44 (concerning the destruction of the
El-Bader flour mill), with Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 208-10, and Israeli counterreport, supra note 8, at 37-38 (concerning the attack on the Namar Wells).
10. Tom Farer, The Goldstone Report on the Gaza Conflict: An Agora, 16 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 139 (2010). See also Jerome Slater, The Attacks on the Goldstone Report, in
THE GOLDSTONE REPORT: THE LEGACY OF THE LANDMARK INVESTIGATION OF THE GAZA
CONFLICT 360-374, 360 (Adam Horowitz, et al. eds., 2011) (stating that the report “has been
so relentlessly and bitterly attacked in Israel and the United States that it has become toxic.”).
11. See, e.g, Abraham Bell, Critique of the Goldstone Report and Its Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 79 (2010); Laurie R. Blank,
Finding Facts But Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare 43 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 279 (2011); William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone, and Lawfare 43 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 307 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Investigating Violations of International Law
in Armed Conflict 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 31 (2011).
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day we still don’t know for certain how many Palestinians were killed
during Operation Cast Lead, and how many of them were unarmed
civilians. Similarly, we do not know for sure whether some of the
attacks described in the Report constituted war crimes or crimes
against humanity, and if so, who was responsible for these crimes,
and how similar incidents might be prevented in the future.
In fact, similar incidents did take place not long after the
Goldstone Report was published, and they continue to occur. For
example, in the summer of 2014, another Israeli-Palestinian war took
place in Gaza (Operation Protective Edge), and new factual and legal
controversies immediately began to rage. The UN Human Rights
Council (“UNHCR”) established a new commission of inquiry to
investigate international law violations committed by Israel during the
2014 Gaza war; 12 Israelis and Palestinians have rounded up the
Facebook and Twitter troops to fight this bitter public opinion battle
over the perception of law and facts; international law scholars have
published contrasting legal opinions concerning Israel Defense Forces
(“IDF”) actions; 13 and the Israeli media went so far as to name those
lawyers defending IDF actions as “Legal Iron Dome.” 14 Once again,
the legal debates have taken over the discussions concerning what
happened, serving as yet another weapon in the war for public
support.
This article argues that during intractable conflicts such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fact-finding missions which center their
efforts – as the Goldstone Mission did – on legal questions, may
trigger backlash and denial, encourage the production of alternative
reports and factual accounts, and ultimately intensify the very
controversies they were set to resolve. Specifically, I argue that the
unnecessary focus of current international fact-finding mechanisms
12. Human Rights Council Res. S-21/1, (July 23, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session21/Pages/21stSpecialSession.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YMN6-5QQQ] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
13. AVI BELL, ISRAEL MAY STOP SUPPLYING WATER AND ELECTRICITY TO GAZA (July
24, 2014), http://en.kohelet.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/israel-may-stop-supplyingwater-and-electricity-to-Gaza-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7J9-VMBA] (archived Dec. 31,
2017); Yuval Shany et. al., Legal Opinion Concerning Supply of Electricity and Water to the
Gaza Strip (July 20, 2014), http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/letters/letter-en-20-714.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV5J-UW8G] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
14. ‘Iron Dome’ is the missile defense system that protects Israeli cities from Palestinian
rockets. See Gilad Grossman, Legal Iron Dome, WALLA! NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012),
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/1/2587639 [https://perma.cc/J77Q-SA9A] (archived Jan. 18,
2018).
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(including the Goldstone Mission) on the ‘legal truth’ 15 triggers
various socio-psychological biases, which impede efforts to
disseminate information. The abstract nature of legal norms creates a
psychological distance between the facts and their audience, thus
making it easier to reject the findings altogether. The adversarial
nature of legal norms, leading to mutually exclusive conclusions,
motivates conflicting societies to completely reject information that
deviates from the national narrative. As a result, the adoption of
dichotomous legal categories may unintentionally intensify distortion
(rather than assertion) of facts.
The article begins, in Part II, by identifying several
contemporary challenges to international fact-finding, including the
contingency of their findings, the ambiguity of their goals, and their
dissemination deficit. Part III explores various socio-psychological
processes and dynamics affecting the dissemination of information
during armed conflicts. Part IV applies this interdisciplinary
theoretical framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and sheds
light on the concrete socio-psychological barriers to fact-finding,
faced by the Goldstone Mission. Finally, Part V suggests some
possible directions for a positive change in the design and
implementation of international fact-finding missions.
II. INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING: CONTEMPORARY
CHALLENGES
From Palestine to Syria, to Afghanistan and Iraq; from Ukraine
to Chechnya, to Serbia, to Congo: one of the most certain facts about
conflicts is uncertainty about facts. 16 The disagreement about facts
may include the history and roots of the conflict, as well as details
concerning ongoing hostilities. Many times, disputes over facts

15. ‘Legal truth’ refers to the adoption of legal categories to construct and interpret facts.
See Shiri Krebs, The Legalization of Truth in International Fact Finding, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L.
83, 92-93 (2017). See also, Jack M. Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5, 6 (2003); Michael S. Moore, The Plain Truth about Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 (2003).
16. Bothe, for example, highlights the importance of ascertaining facts in a variety of
conflicts, be they of a social, political or legal character. See Michael Bothe, Fact-Finding as a
Means of Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 249-67 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg &
Volker Epping eds., 2007).
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become so intense they nourish and intensify the conflict, 17 and thus
pave the way to reoccurrence of crimes and abuses. 18
To resolve such controversies and determine “what happened,”
international organizations (including UN bodies, such as the Office
of the Secretary-General and the Human Rights Council) have
increasingly employed international commissions of inquiry or factfinding missions. 19 These missions serve as a way to ascertain facts
by way of gathering immediate, credible, and first-hand
information, 20 based on rigorous methodology, 21 adequate
recourses, 22 and qualified personnel. 23
In recent decades, there has been a tremendous increase in the
number of fact-finding institutions, as well as increasing variety in
their mandates and establishing bodies. 24 Nonetheless, many of these
international fact-finding missions share two common structures: the

17. For an elaborated discussion on the disagreement on facts as a socio-psychological
barrier to conflict resolution, see Suzanne Retzinger & Thomas Scheff, Emotion, Alienation,
and Narratives: Resolving Intractable Conflict, 18 MEDIATION Q. 71-85 (2000); Peter T.
Coleman, Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a
Metaframework-I, 9 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 1, 19 (2003).
18. For a comprehensive analysis of preservation of conflicting narratives and beliefs in
intractable conflict, see Daniel Bar-Tal, Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable
Conflicts, 50 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1430 (2007). See also Neta Oren & Daniel Bar-Tal, The
Detrimental Dynamics of Delegitimization in Intractable Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian
Case, 31 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 111 (2007).
19. Krebs, supra note 15, at 94-95.
20. See generally H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TERMINOLOGY 88, 127 (2004); Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Introductionto INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); see also G.A. Res. 46/49 (Dec.
9, 1991).
21. Diane F Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights FactFinding, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 83, 85 (1990); see generally Théo Boutruche, Credible FactFinding and Allegations of International Humanitarian Law Violations: Challenges in Theory
and Practice, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 105 (2011).
22. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 35, 42 (2001).
23. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 42. Indeed, fact-finding efforts in a variety of contexts
“requires one to perfect strategies for information gathering, interpersonal communication, and
analysis of both the legal and non-legal dimensions of a particular socio-legal problem.”
Johanna Bond, The Global Classroom: International Human Rights Fact-Finding as Clinical
Method, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 317, 328 (2001).
24. For a brief overview of fact-finding mechanisms established by the international
community since 1913, see Rob Grace & Claude Bruderlein, Building Effective Monitoring,
Reporting, and Fact-finding Mechanisms 3-9 (Program on Humanitarian Pol’y and Conflict
Res., Harv. Univ. Working Paper, 2012).
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lack of compulsory jurisdiction or enforcement capacity; 25 and the
adoption of legal categories (such as war crimes and crimes against
humanity) to interpret the facts and infuse meaning into their
findings. 26 The combination of these common structures of
international fact-finding mechanisms separates them from other
accountability mechanisms (such as international tribunals), and
generates several challenges for the production and dissemination of
fact-finding reports. The next Sections will focus on three of these
challenges to international fact-finding missions, including the
contingency of their findings, the ambiguity of their goals, and their
dissemination deficit.
A. Factual Contingency
What are facts for the purposes of international fact-finding
missions? What types of facts are to be included in the fact-fining
process? Should all types of facts be treated equally, using the same
methodology and subject to the same burden of proof? In fact, during
fact-finding processes various types of facts are collected, produced
and interpreted. Some facts are brute or physical facts, for example,
the number of fatalities or weapons’ remains found at the scene; other
facts are inferences and predictions, such as risk assessments or
anticipated levels of threat; value-judgments, such as the
excessiveness of harm, represent yet another kind of fact; and lastly,
there are legal facts or legal interpretations, which include
categorizing an individual as a ‘civilian,’ or determining that a certain
behavior constitutes a crime. Each of these types of facts presents a
different challenge with regard to fact-finding processes, appropriate
methodologies, and burdens of proof.
Nonetheless, fact-finders in a variety of legal contexts often
disregard the unique empirical challenges raised by each type of fact,
and adopt similar processes to obtain and interpret facts. 27 The
25. Geoffrey Palmer, Reform of UN Inquiries, in FOR THE SAKE OF FUTURE
GENERATIONS-ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, CRIME JUSTICE IN HONOUR OF ROGER S.
CLARK 597, 610-615 (2015).
26. In another study, I compiled a data set of UN fact-finding missions throughout the
years, and analyzed their mandates and goals, finding that a large majority were tasked with
promoting legal accountability based on legal categories and interpretation. See Krebs, supra
note 15, at 94-96.
27. Michael D. Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of Evidence and
Proof, 47 GA. LAW REV. 801 (2013); see, also Michael S. Moore, The Plain Truth about Legal
Truth, 26 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24-26 (2003) (distinguishing between propositions
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Goldstone Mission, for example, adopted an “inclusive approach to
gathering information and seeking views” and held public hearings
which “covered facts as well as legal and military matters.” 28 In
establishing its findings, the Goldstone Mission referred to objective
and subjective elements of the crimes in question, yet clarified that its
findings did not reach the standard of proof applicable in criminal
trials. 29 The Goldstone Mission did not elucidate which standard of
proof was adopted instead. Similarly to many other fact-finding
bodies, the Goldstone Mission entertained the idea that a “[factfinding] report speaks for itself.” 30 However, the facts produced by
fact-finding missions almost never speak for themselves; rather,
of fact, general law, interpretation, value, and logic). Instead, facts have been treated as
objects, waiting to be ‘found’ through a neutral process of fact-finding. Kim Lane Scheppele,
Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 125-26 (1992).
28. The Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 15.
29. Id. at 16 (clarifying that its findings do not attempt to identify the individuals
responsible for the commission of offences).
30. In a press conference following the release of the Goldstone Report, Justice
Goldstone expressly stated that “the report speaks for itself” in documenting crimes committed
by both Israel and Hamas. Human Rights Council, Unofficial transcript of 29 September 2009
Press Conference at the Palais des Nations in Geneva by Members of the UN Fact Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict - Justice Richard Goldstone, Hina Jilani, Professor Christine
Chinkin, Colonel Desmond Travers, at 7 (Sept. 29, 2009) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session9/Pages/FactFindingMission.aspx.
Former
UN
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, opined, similarly, that “the facts speak for themselves,”
while referring to the findings of the UN Commission of Inquiry that “[Syrian] Government
and pro-government forces have committed murder, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial
executions, rape and torture against civilians,” and determining that these actions and the use
of chemical weapons by Syrian forces amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
United Nations Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council on the report of the
United Nations Missions to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons on the
incident that occurred on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus, UNITED NATIONS
SEC’Y GEN., (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-0916/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-report-united-nations [https://perma.cc/PGV6U7X5] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). Also, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented
the report of the fact-finding mission to Iraq to the UN Security Council by stating that “the
report of the fact-finding mission speaks for itself.” U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb.
23, 2004 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.C. Doc.
S/2004/140 (Feb. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
S/2004/140 [https://perma.cc/PU6T-9AKL] (archived Jan. 19, 2017); see also The Facts Speak
for Themselves: The Preliminary Report on Disappearances of the National Commissioner for
the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 1, 1994),
https://www.hrw.org/report/1994/07/01/facts-speak-themselves/preliminary-reportdisappearances-national-commissioner [https://perma.cc/KG5L-62RD] (archived Dec. 31,
2017); Rob Grace, Communication and Report Drafting in Monitoring, Reporting, and Factfinding Mechanisms 13, 53 (Program on Humanitarian Pol’y and Conflict Res., Harv. Univ.
Working Paper, 2014).
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various institutional and design choices speak for them. Specifically,
the decision to adopt legal categories to interpret the facts, produces a
contingent version of reality, as it adheres to legal rules and processes
that frame the story, infuse it with meaning, and dictate how the
relevant facts are construed.
Ontologically, law provides norms and rules that construct
reality in a specific manner, and this legal reality or legal truth may
differ from non-legal constructions of reality. 31 Terms such as
‘genocide,’ ‘civilian,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘torture,’ or even ‘responsibility’
have unique meanings as legal terms, and potentially other meanings
outside the law, within political, ethical, or moral discourses. When
we adopt legal categories to interpret reality and determine the truth,
the findings relate to the legal reality, which may be very different
from the moral, ethical, or political interpretation of reality. 32 For
example, a finding that 764 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli
security forces during operation cast lead depends on the
interpretation of the legal category ‘civilians.’ 33 Applying a moral or
ethical interpretation, a political interpretation, or even a different
legal interpretation – may dramatically change our findings
concerning the number of civilians killed. Additionally, legal
categories are often dichotomous, coercing complex reality into
simplified categories such as ‘combatant’ or ‘civilian,’ ‘lawful,’ or
‘unlawful.’ The categorization itself forces meaning onto the facts,
and simplifies compound and nuanced representations. 34
31. See Michael S. Moore, Legal reality: A naturalist approach to legal ontology, 21
LAW & PHIL. 619, 628 (2002) (“we thus can expect no precision in how to combine the very
general moral, historical, scientific, and semantic facts that make a legal interpretation
correct.”); Balkin, supra note 15, at 7 (“law’s truth is not the only truth, and law’s vision of
reality is not the only reality.”)
32. See Balkin, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing that law’s power to enforce its vision of the
world can clash with other practices of knowledge, and with other forms of truth).
33. This indeed raised heated controversies following the release of the Goldstone
Report, especially concerning the appropriate legal categorization of the 248 Palestinian police
officers who were killed by Israeli forces at the outset of the war. See, e.g., Michael N.
Schmitt, Military necessity and humanity in international humanitarian law: preserving the
delicate balance, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES 89, 116 (2011); see also
Israel/Gaza: Civilians Must Not Be Targets, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 30, 2009),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/30/israel/gaza-civilians-must-not-be-targets
[https://perma.cc/RZH4-CZPV] (archived Dec. 31, 2017); Israel’s Gaza Toll Far Lower Than
Palestinian Tally, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLQ977827
[https://perma.cc/3XCZ-WK5M] (archived Jan. 20, 2018).
34. Sherwin explores, more generally, the clash between law’s demand for truth and
justice and the modem mind’s demand for closure and certainty, leading lawyers and processes
of adjudication to simplify reality, by leaving the ‘messy things’ out. See generally Richard K.
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Epistemologically, legal categories limit and define what is
considered ‘true’ in various ways. First, legal conventions,
jurisdiction and rules of evidence join in to carve the boundaries of
the story they tell, by limiting the universe of facts that are included in
the legal account of ‘what happened.’ Rooted rules of admissibility
may serve to exclude various facts from the fact-finding process, even
if they do not formally apply. For example, it is often the case that
only facts that are specifically relevant to answering the legal question
- such as causes of death or intent of the perpetrator - are included.
Other facts, relating, for example, to the more distant roots of the
conflict, broader social processes of dehumanization, or acts
committed outside the temporal or geographical jurisdiction of the
fact-finding body - are excluded. 35 Second, legal epistemology further
restructures the story by determining the weight and reliability of the
relevant facts. Legal rules determine the value and strength of the
information collected, preferring some facts over others.
While many of these rules are designed to promote an accurate
account of events, 36 they nonetheless represent a deliberate choice
concerning how to construct reality. Moreover, some rules of
evidence depart from the goal of ascertaining the truth and favor other
purposes, such as protecting national security, deterring police
misconduct, or even controlling the direction of errors. These rules
determine how facts should be treated and interpreted, what the
required burden of proof is, and which evidence should be suppressed
(because it is considered hearsay, because the information is
privileged, because it was obtained unlawfully, or because of several
other reasons). Either way, law requires us to determine ‘what
happened’ while ignoring important facts that describe some aspects
of the events in question.
Ultimately, facts collected to answer a legal question, based on
legal categories, are not neutral or natural; rather, they create a
contingent description of certain events. As Jack Balkin pointed out,
“law’s truth is not the only truth, and law’s vision of reality is not the
Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 39, 40-41 (1994).
35. Sara Kendall & Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Speaking of Legacy: Toward an Ethos of
Modesty at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 212, 223
(2016) (“Historical accounts produced through international criminal trials are notoriously
incomplete”).
36. See Fed. R. Evid. 102.
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only reality.” 37 There are many other forms of knowledge acquisition
in the world, and many other conventions through which people
assess information and determine what is true or false. 38 In this era of
constant challenges to knowledge and information, where ‘alternative
facts’ are frequently produced to counter unwelcomed information,
and when critical findings are denounced as ‘fake news’, the outputs
of international fact-finding missions are particularly sensitive to
competing findings. Therefore, international fact-finding missions
should be sensitive to the various contingencies of their findings, and
adopt a humbler approach concerning the ‘indisputable’ nature of
these findings. As fact-finding reports do not speak for themselves, it
is imperative that fact-finding missions would carefully choose the
voice that speaks for them.
B. Goal Ambiguity
‘Ascertaining facts’ is a core purpose of any fact-finding body.
Nonetheless, it is usually not the only, or even the main, goal of
international fact-finding. Typically, international organizations
invest a great deal of resources in fact-finding efforts in order to
utilize the ascertained facts for a further purpose. Throughout the
years, international fact-finding missions (or commissions of inquiry)
have been established to promote a variety of goals, such as
promoting accountability, preventing future atrocities, facilitating
reconciliation or advancing peaceful resolution of international
conflicts. 39 These different purposes dictate a variety of fact-finding
methods, processes and tools, as well as diverse authorities, mandates
and jurisdictions.
In spite of this potential diversity both in goals and in processes,
international fact-finding has been increasingly used by the
international community within a narrow legalistic context. In the past
few decades, international fact-finding missions have become a
37. Balkin, supra note 15, at 7; see also RICHARD A. WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 9 (2011) (“Because courts follow law’s own exceptional
principles rather than those of historical inquiry, they can reduce complex histories to a
defective legal template, and thereby distort history.”).
38. See Balkin, supra note 15, at 11.
39. See Erin Daly, Truth skepticism: An inquiry into the value of truth in times of
transition, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 24 (2008); Krebs, supra note 15, at 95-97; see
generally Boutruche, supra note 21; Edwin Brown Firmage, Fact-Finding in the Resolution of
International Disputes - From the Hague Peace Conference to the United Nations, 1971 UTAH
L. REV. 421; Orentlicher, supra note 21.

350

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:337

dominant method to ensure the implementation of and to promote
respect for international law, mainly international human rights law
(“IHR”) and international humanitarian law (“IHL”). 40 Similarly,
most of the relevant literature on international fact-finding missions
have focused on the legal aspects of international fact-finding: the
required standard of proof to assign responsibility; the gravity
threshold of violations to be considered by a fact-finding body; and
the implementation, interpretation and enforcement of IHL and
HRL. 41 The long-term goals of fact-finding in this context have been
to promote legal accountability and to establish a basis for national or
international adjudication processes. Nonetheless, the mandates of
these international fact-finding missions have often failed to identify,
clarify, and prioritize the core goals of the missions.
This goal ambiguity is problematic due to several reasons. First,
it hinders attempts to clarify policy direction ex ante, and to assess the
missions’ success ex post. 42 Second, it prevents a more thoughtful
design process, which would enable tailoring appropriate processes to
the specified goals. For example, the goal of promoting legal
accountability requires access to evidence and witnesses, resting on
either voluntary or compulsory cooperation. Third, it diminishes the
significance of finding facts for the sake of establishing truth(s). The
focus on legal questions suggests that fact-finding is meaningless
without a legal interpretation of the facts, and that some vague form
of legal accountability is more important than creating a historical
record or promoting a dual-narrative rather than an adversarial legal
truth.

40. See generally Boutruche, supra note 21, at 107-08; Krebs, supra note 15, at 94-95;
Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 83-85.
41. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: REVISED AND EDITED REPRINT (Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed., 2014); Michael Bothe,
supra note 16, at 249; Grace & Bruderlein, supra note 24, at 31. See generally Boutruche,
supra note 21; Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 85. .Until recently, the political, moral, ethical,
and social aspects of international fact-finding have been rarely dealt with. An important
contribution in this regard is THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING (Philip
Alston & Sarah Knuckey eds., 2016), which raises political, moral and critical aspects of the
practice of fact-finding.
42. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems
Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009), at 129-130.
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C. Dissemination of Information
In his oral remarks from March 22, 2016, Christof Heyns, UN
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions
and member of the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi, stated
that “it is crucial to ascertain the disputed facts in an indisputable
manner.” 43 Similarly, international tribunals, such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, have emphasized their
roles in creating indisputable and undeniable historical records of
otherwise controversial wartime events. 44 Nonetheless, it is evident
that denialism is still thriving, in the former Yugoslavia and
elsewhere. 45 Indeed, it is often the case that fact-finding reports fail to
resolve the very controversies they were sent to investigate, and may
even intensify them. 46 For example, the Rwandan Government
rejected the 2010 Democratic Republic of the Congo Report and
named it “dangerous and irresponsible”; 47 the Israeli Government
43. Oral update by Christof Heyns, U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, Member of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi
(UNIIB), on the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Burundi, Human Rights Council (Mar. 22,
2016), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5728500c4.html.
44. See Achievements, U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements [https://perma.cc/BPM7JX6J] (last visited Dec. 31, 2017); Sara Kendall and Sarah MH Nouwen, supra note 35, at 216
(2016) (citing Judge Dennis Byron’s Address to the UN General Assembly, ICTR
NEWSLETTER
1
(Oct.
2008),
http://www.unmict.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/
news/newsletters/oct08.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8T9-234N] (archived Dec. 31, 2017)).
45. Marko Milanovic, The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An
Anticipatory Post-Mortem, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 233, 235 (2016). While similar public opinion
data from Rwanda is not available, the prosecutions brought against ‘genocide deniers’ and the
many laws recently enacted to prevent denialism, may demonstrate that the phenomenon
persists. See generally Yakaré-Oulé (Nani) Jansen, Denying Genocide or Denying Free
Speech? A Case Study of the Application of Rwanda’s Genocide Denial Laws, 12 NW. J. INT’L
HUM. RTS. 191 (2014); Filip Reyntjens, Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent,
Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-genocide Rwanda, 110 AFR. AFF. 1 (2011).
46. Alston et al., supra note 41, at 3. In a recent UN publication, the High Commissioner
for Human Rights welcomed such controversies as “publicity,” and argued that they increase
the public profile of the investigations and thus highlight the important role of the
investigations in promoting accountability. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r,
Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, at 7, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/14/7 (2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43VC-9VP5] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
47. Statement by the Government of Rwanda on Leaked Draft UN Report on DRC,
RWANDA NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 27, 2010), http://rnanews.com/politics/4080-statement-by-thegovernment-of-rwanda-on-leaked-draft-un-report-on-drc
[https://perma.cc/EX9H-FGZD]
(archived Dec. 31, 2017).
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fought against the 2009 Goldstone Report and insisted that it was
“false and distorted,” 48 while an overwhelming majority of JewishIsraelis opined that the Report was biased and untrustworthy; 49 and
the UN High Commissioner for Human rights criticized the Sri
Lankan Government’s attacks on the integrity of the UN fact-finding
mission on Sri Lanka, referring to it as a “continuing campaign of
distortion and disinformation.” 50
Nonetheless, the resources that international organizations
devote to compiling fact-finding reports are not matched by attention
to how reports are disseminated or what impact they might have on
their target audiences. 51 Little attention (if any) has been given thus
far to their effect on communal attitudes and beliefs and public
opinion in affected communities. 52 As evidence of backlash and
denial mount, international fact-finding bodies should devote
significant attention to the dissemination of their findings to a variety
of audiences. Creating a historical record and mitigating controversy
and denial cannot be achieved by simply releasing fact-finding
reports. The processes and structures adopted to document abuses
inevitably influence how well reports navigate the obstacles to
successful dissemination of information and, ultimately, their
persuasive power. The next Part will discuss a variety of sociopsychological biases that may hinder the dissemination of fact-finding
reports, and frustrate efforts to resolve factual controversies and
create a shared historical record.

48. Barak: Goldstone Report “False, Distorted, and Irresponsible,” HAARETZ (Jan. 28,
2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/barak-goldstone-report-false-distorted-and-irresponsible1.265821 [https://perma.cc/YFV6-K2XC] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
49. Following the release of the 2009 Goldstone Report, an Israeli public opinion poll
found that 93.5% of Jewish Israelis believed the report was biased against Israel. See Yaar et
al., supra note 7. For a more elaborate discussion of Israeli reaction to the Goldstone Report
see infra Section IV.D.
50. Zeid condemns persistent disinformation designed to discredit UN investigation on
Sri Lanka, UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15263
[https://perma.cc/ZP5G-JY33] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
51. Stanley Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials,
and Counterclaims, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 518 (1996).
52. Alston and Knuckey, supra note 41, at 4.
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III. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL
FACT-FINDING DURING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS
Every intractable conflict is intractable in its own way. 53 Yet all
intractable conflicts share a common source of their intractability, in
the form of resistance to information that deviates from core social
beliefs and narratives. 54 This Part discusses the socio-psychological
barriers to the dissemination of fact-finding reports in the context of
intractable conflicts, shedding light on some of the processes which
compromise social receptiveness to fact-finding reports. These
include a variety of socio-psychological dynamics, including
cognitive consistency and biased assimilation of new information, 55
confirmation bias, 56 motivated cognition, 57 and collective memories
and beliefs, 58 which may trigger distortion or rejection of threatening
53. “Happy families are all alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” LEO
TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (1980). For a discussion of persistent conflicts and their
intractability, see generally Peter T. Coleman et al, Intractable conflict as an attractor: A
dynamical systems approach to conflict escalation and intractability, 50 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1454 (2007).
54. Coleman, supra note 17, at 6.
55. According to cognitive consistency theories, human cognition is substantially
affected by mutual interaction among pieces of psychological knowledge. Mounting evidence
further demonstrates processes of biased assimilation of new information, meaning, people
tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs. Charles Lord, Lee
Ross, and Mark Leper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098
(1979); D. Simon, C.J. Snow, and S.J. Read, The Redux of Cognitive Consistency Theories:
Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 814
(2004).
56. Confirmation bias connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are
partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or hypothesis in hand. See Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175
(1998).
57. Kunda explains that a motivation to arrive at particular conclusions may affect
reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes (strategies for accessing,
constructing, and evaluating beliefs) that are considered most likely to yield the desired
conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions
that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct
seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
58. Societal beliefs and collective memories are cognitions shared by society members
on topics and issues that are of special concern for the particular society, and which contribute
to the sense of uniqueness of the society’s members. Daniel Bar-Tal, Societal Beliefs in Times
of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case, 9 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 22, 25-26 (1998);
Daniel Bar-Tal, Collective Memory of Physical Violence: its Contribution to the Culture of
Violence, in THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN ETHNIC CONFLICT 77 (Ed Cairns & Michael D. Roe
eds., 2003).
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information. Generally, the construction and evaluation of
information in social settings is influenced by prior beliefs, ideologies
and interests, 59 as well as group identities and commitments. 60
These processes become more pronounced in the context of
intractable conflicts, which are broadly defined as “conflicts that are
recalcitrant, intense, deadlocked, and extremely difficult to resolve.” 61
Each intractable conflict can differ by level of importance (from
superficial to existential concerns), centrality (to one’s identity,
esteem, and sense of reality), pervasiveness (number of
interconnections with other conflicts and experiences), and duration.62
Importantly, each of the disputing groups develops a dominant
narrative, emphasizing the “objective” goodness of one side’s claims
over the other side’s claims. As a result, contradictory narratives
emerge for each of the disputing groups and become promoted to
unquestioned fact or truth. 63 It is principally this subjective process of
perception and interpretation, which drives reactions and behaviors
and generates resistance to more nuanced information, which deviates
from each group’s narrative. 64
The following Sections focus specifically on the dynamic of
threatened social identities during intractable armed conflicts, and
explain how fact-finding processes may frustrate efforts to
disseminate information that is inconsistent with national narratives
and core societal beliefs. Afterwards, this socio-psychological
framework will be used to explain some of the backlash against the
Goldstone Report expressed by the Jewish-Israeli society.

59. Ifat Maoz et al., Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace
Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515, 543 (2002).
60. Dan M. Kahan et al., They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechConduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012); see also: LYNN EDEN, WHOLE WORLD ON
FIRE: ORGANIZATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 37–60 (2004).
61. Coleman, supra note 17, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 19; see also Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon, Narratives of the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict: Evolvement, Contents, Functions and Consequences, in ISRAELI AND
PALESTINIAN NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT: HISTORY’S DOUBLE HELIX 19 (Robert I. Rotberg ed.,
2006); Barbara Tint, History, memory, and intractable conflict 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 239
(2010).
64. Coleman, supra note 17, at 19.
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A. Social Identities
Identity is an individual’s sense of self, of being a human
agent. 65 It is a product of self-consciousness, a process in which a
person or a group possesses distinct qualities as an entity, which
differentiates him or her from others. 66 An important component of an
individual’s identity is his or her social identity, which captures the
individual’s knowledge that she belongs to certain social groups,
together with some emotional significance to her of these group
memberships. 67 To enhance their social identities, individuals tend to
behave in ways that make their own group acquire positive
distinctiveness in comparison to other groups. 68
An individual’s social identity is composed of multiple identities
based on social classifications. 69 These may include familial,
territorial, class, religious, ethnic, gender, and national classifications.
National identity is a social identity based on elements such as
historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical
memories; common mass public culture; and common legal rights and
duties for all the members of the community. 70 Unlike a state, which
refers exclusively to public institutions relating to the monopoly of
coercion within a given territory, a nation signifies a bond that is both
cultural and political, uniting in a single political community all who
share a historic culture and homeland. 71
The most salient political function of national identity is its
legitimization of legal institutions that define the values and character
65. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
3 (1989).
66. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S
NATIONAL IDENTITY 21 (2004).
67. John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL
IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 18 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982).
68. Ed Cairns, Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 277, 278 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982); Huntington, supra note 66, at 25.
69. ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 4 (1991); Jan. E. Stets & Peter J. Burke,
Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOCIAL PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 225 (2000).
70. Smith, supra note 69, at 14; see alsoAnna Triandafyllidou, National Identity and the
‘Other’, 21 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 593, 599 (1998) (emphasizing the notion of the
others as an inherent characteristic of nationalism and national identity); BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (2006).
71. Smith, supra note 69, at 14-15. Blum further analyzes the relations between nations
and states, and discusses the applications of identity theory on both the relations between
citizens and their state, and between sovereign states. See WILLIAM BLUM, PERSONAL
IDENTITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-5 (1990).
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of the nation and reflect the customs of the people.72 Therefore, the
appeal to national identity has become the main legitimization for
social order and solidarity. 73 Additionally, national identity serves as
a tool for the socialization of group members as nationals and
citizens, through compulsory, standardized, public, mass education
systems. 74 By using state-controlled primary education, stateorganized propaganda, official rewriting of history, and militarism,
the national identity is affirmed and reaffirmed by political
institutions. 75 As a result, Smith finds that these systems enable state
authorities to inculcate national devotion and a distinctive,
homogeneous culture. 76 Furthermore, by the use of symbols such as
flags, anthems, uniforms, monuments, and ceremonies, group
members are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship,
and their sense of belonging is enhanced. 77
B. Societal Beliefs, Collective Memory, and Ethos of Conflict
History is highly contextual, defined by social psychological
processes and constructed by collective memories and beliefs. 78
Understanding memory as a group, rather than individual,
phenomenon, highlights its contextual and collective dimension, as
well as the institutional processes and techniques used to create,
reinforce and commemorate it. 79 Tint mentions various such
techniques, including selective omission, fabrication, exaggeration
and embellishment, implication of causal linkages, blaming the
enemy, and reframing contextual factors. 80
According to Bar-Tal, societal beliefs, which are shared by the
majority of the society members, define cues for the interpretation
and evaluation of information. 81 In the context of intractable conflicts,
72. Smith, supra note 69, at 16.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Anderson, supra note 70, at 104.
76. Smith, supra note 69, at 16.
77. Id., at 16-17.
78. James W. Pennebaker and Becky L. Banasik, On the Creation and Maintenance of
Collective Memories: History as Social Psychology, in COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF POLITICAL
EVENTS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 19 (James W. Pennebaker et al. eds.,
2013).
79. Tint, supra note 63, at 241.
80. Id., at 243.
81. Bar-Tal, supra note 18, at 1435 (2007) (defining ‘societal beliefs’ as “cognitions
shared by society members on topics and issues that are of special concern for their society and
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societal beliefs of collective memory present the history of the
conflict to society members, and create a socially constructed
narrative that has some basis in actual events but is biased, selective,
and distorted in ways that meet the nation’s present needs. 82
Similarly, societies in conflict may further develop a particular ‘ethos
of conflict,’ which provides each group with a clear image of the
conflict, its goals, and its development, as well as rigid perceptions of
the in-group and of the enemy. 83
The combination of these collective memories, beliefs, and ethos
creates a holistic national narrative that serves to view the in-group as
a victim, to delegitimize the adversary, and to justify acts of violence
and destruction toward the enemy. 84 Importantly, it explains why, too
often, communities in conflict entertain contradictory and selective
histories of the same event, thus perpetuating the conflict. 85
C. Dissemination of Information and the Dynamic of Threatened
National Identities
During intractable conflicts, core information concerning the
conflict, the actions of the in-group and the adversary, and significant
events, is therefore institutionalized as collective memories or societal
beliefs, and form a part of the national narrative. Therefore,
information which is inconsistent with such identity-preserving
beliefs threatens not only the concrete outlook concerning the relevant
events, but also the individual’s national identity. 86 In the context of
an intractable conflict, a threat to the national identity (as long as it is
a part of the social identity which is core to the self) typically results
in a protective response. 87 Northrup explains that to protect and
sustain the existing beliefs, and to minimize the threat, it is likely that
the new invalidating information will be rejected, distorted, or
contribute to their sense of uniqueness. They provide a basis for common understanding of
reality, good communication, interdependence, and the coordination of social activities, all of
which are necessary for the functioning of the social system.”).
82. Id., at 1436.
83. Bar-Tal, supra note 18, at 1438.
84. Id., at 1439-1441.
85. Tint, supra note 63, at 242.
86. Kelly terms such beliefs “core constructs.” GEORGE KELLY, A PSYCHOLOGY OF
PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS (1955).
87. Terrell A. Northrup, The Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict, in
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55, 66, 68 (Louis Kriesberg, Terrell
A. Northrup, & Stuart J. Thorson eds., 1989).
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misperceived. 88 the distortion of such threatening information may
take different forms, such as denial and rejection of the invalidating
information as false, or redefining its content. 89 Cohen terms this later
form of distortion “interpretive denial,” where the raw facts are
accepted, but are given a different meaning from what seems apparent
to others. 90As this process persists over time, the threatened group
develops a rigid interpretation of the world, and increasingly
perceives the other group as entirely different from the in-group. 91
These distortion and hardening processes account for
stereotyping, which generally leads to depersonalization and
dehumanization of the other group. 92 The dehumanization process
attributes ‘evil’ qualities to the other group, construes it as less than
human, and thus makes violence against the other more tolerable
(since it is easier to harm something or someone who is inhumane).93
Northrup emphasizes that a part of the dehumanization process
involves accepting less and less information about the enemy, and
relying solely on a distorted psychological construction. 94 As a result,
each of the conflicting groups perceives the adversary to be more
hostile than they actually are, and at the same time, perceive their own
side as less threatening than it appears to the other party. 95
These socio-psychological processes of denial, misperception
and misinterpretation of new information which is inconsistent with
core societal beliefs are institutionalized in various ways:
governmental censorship of information, use of punishments against
providers of alternative information, control of mass media, delegitimization of alternative information and its sources, closure of
archives, encouragement and reward of cultural products supporting
88. Id.
89. Id. at 69. See also ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 143 (1976) (defining this process “assimilation of information to
pre-existing beliefs,” while implementing it to decision-making process in international
relation.).
90. Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering 6, 7-8
(2013).
91. Markus Kemmelmeier & David G. Winter, Putting Threat into Perspective:
Experimental Studies on Perceptual Distortion in International Conflict, 26 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 795, 796 (2000).
92. Turner, supra note 67, at 8.
93. Northrup, supra note 85, at 72-74. For a full analysis of the dehumanization process
and its implication on intergroup conflict, see Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative
Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 252 (2006).
94. Northrup, supra note 85, at 74.
95. Kemmelmeier & Winter, supra note 88, at 795.
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this narrative, are merely a few such examples. 96 Though these
mechanisms are most often introduced by the Government or other
formal institutions, they also operate on the individual level. 97 Selfcensorship, for example, may be practiced by a significant portion of
society as a method of restricting the flow of information in order to
protect the in-group. 98
In summary, the dissemination of information concerning
controversial wartime events, in the context of intractable armed
conflicts, is influenced by prior beliefs and national identities of its
audiences. 99 The socio-psychological infrastructure described above
influences cognitive processes of the society members as individuals
as well as a collective.100 It leads to a selective, biased, and distortive
flow of information which, in essence, prevents people from
absorbing and accepting alternative information that could have
otherwise provided clarity about the conflict and its possible
solutions. 101 During these processes, information that threatens the
national identity or contradicts any of its core elements may be
misperceived or rejected, and control mechanisms may be employed –
at both the individual and social levels – to ensure the stability and
dominance of the national narrative. 102
D. What’s Law Got To Do With It?
In the context of wartime investigations, legal categories are
particularly prone to trigger threat. First, legal categories tend to rely
on binary dichotomies and often fail to recognize ambiguous or
complex situations. 103 They require clear-cut categorization of facts
into pre-determined bins: lawful or unlawful; guilty or not guilty;
96. Bar-Tal, supra note 18, at 1445.
97. Boaz Hameiri et al., Support for Self-Censorship Among Israelis as a Barrier to
Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 38 POL. PSYCHOL. 795, 797 (2017).
98. Id., at 799.
99. Ifat Maoz et al., Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace
Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515, 543 (2002).
100. Chan, Burtis and Bereiter’s study on knowledge construction found that individuals
distort and twist information to make it fit with prior beliefs. Carol Chan, Jud Burtis & Carl
Bereiter, Knowledge Building as a Mediator of Conflict in Conceptual Change, 15 COGNITION
& INSTRUCTION 1, 5 (1997). See also Baumeister & Hastings, supra note 80, at 287.
101. Daniel Bar-Tal et al., Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peace Making: The Case of
the Israeli Jewish Society, 4 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 63, 97 (2010).
102. Bar-Tal, supra note 18, at 1445.
103. Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate,
41 ISR. L. REV. 68, 69 (2008).
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combatant or civilian. This adversarial nature of legal categories may
be perceived by disputing societies as particularly threatening of
preconceived narratives and beliefs. That is because by their very
nature, binary legal categories create inconsistency between the legal
category and at least one of the conflicting narratives. For that reason,
lawyers and legal arguments may be “better equipped for
confrontation than for other less costly means of resolving
disputes.” 104 As a result, the adoption of binary legal categories may
unintentionally intensify distortion, rather than assertion, of facts.
Second, legal categories in the context of wartime investigations
may be exceptionally threatening to core social narratives and beliefs
because of their high cost. Legal categories represent a strong sense of
blame and condemnation, often accompanied by severe implications.
Specifically, classifying concrete acts into legal categories of “war
crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” or “genocide” may backfire, as
these are some of the most heinous crimes known to mankind,
representing a high level of blame, social ostracism and disgust, as
well as, at least potentially, a lifetime in prison. 105
Third, the abstract nature of legal norms may generate a
psychological distance between the facts and their audience, thus
making it easier to ignore the concrete circumstances or the harmed
individuals, and to focus on the abstract legal argumentation.106
Indeed, individual, concrete human voices, and abstract, general legal
rules, often conflict. 107 In Lowering the Bar, Marc Galanter argued
that “[l]awyers corrupt discourse by promoting needless complexity,
mystifying matters by jargon and formalities, robbing life’s dealings
of their moral sense by recasting them in legal abstractions, and
offending common sense by casuistry that makes black appear white

104. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its denial in legal discourse, 76 VA. L. REV.
1545, 1546 (1990).
105. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L. L. 78 (1994); Thomas W. Smith, Moral hazard and
humanitarian law: The International Criminal Court and the limits of legalism, 39 INT’L POL.
175 (2002).
106. Psychological distance is a subjective experience that something is close or far
away from the self, here, and now. Trope and Liberman established that as the level of
abstraction increases, so too would the psychological distances people envisage. See generally
Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Construal-level theory of psychological distance, 117
PSYCHOL. REV. 440 (2010).
107. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1989).
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and vice versa.” 108 In the context of international fact-finding during
intractable armed conflicts, these legal abstractions and complexities
may grab attention at the expense of the brute or physical facts. As a
result, they may promote an adversarial approach to facts and factfinding more generally, attributing the argumentative nature of legal
interpretations to the brute facts interpreted using legal lenses.
IV. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO THE
DISSEMINATION OF THE GOLDSTONE REPORT
A. Resistance to Facts Relating to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Within the Jewish-Israeli Society
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at its core a conflict between
two national movements. 109 It is a prototypical case of an intractable
conflict: it is a long and violent conflict, which greatly occupies the
society members, and is perceived as irresolvable. 110 Its prolonged
duration increases its intractability, since the current populations of
both conflicting societies have been raised from infancy knowing
nothing else than a perpetual state of war with the ‘other.’ 111 The
intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is particularly high, since
the national identities of the conflicting groups invalidate each
other. 112 In the perception of both groups is it a zero-sum conflict not only with respect to territory but, most importantly, with respect
to national identity and national existence. 113
Based on both public opinion polls and on public speeches by
high profile politicians, Bar-Tal, Halperin, and Oren demonstrated the
resistance of the Jewish-Israeli society to acknowledging the
Palestinian society’s narrative. In fact, the level of resistance to the
Palestinian narrative has grown in recent years to the point that the
prevailing view in the Israeli society is that the West Bank is not
108. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 17
(2005).
109. Herbert C. Kelman, The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National
Identities: The Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 581, 588 (1999).
110. Bar-Tal et al., supra note 101, at 64.
111. Stephen Cohen, Intractability and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in GRASPING
THE NETTLE: ANALYZING CASES OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 343, 343 (Chester A. Crocker,
et al. eds., 2005).
112. Northrup, supra note 85, at 68.
113. Kelman, supra note 110, at 588.
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occupied (but liberated). 114 Public opinion polls further demonstrate
strong opposition among Jewish-Israelis to any attempt to recognize
the Palestinian narrative. For example, a Peace Index poll, conducted
in June 2009, found that 56% of the Jewish-Israeli public oppose
Israel taking even partial responsibility for the suffering caused to the
Palestinians by the 1948 war. 115 Bar-Tal, Halperin and Oren further
demonstrated that 79% of Jewish Israelis agreed with the statement
that dishonesty has always characterized the Palestinians and the
Arabs. 116 Additionally, another study found that 61% of the Jewish
Israelis agreed, at least to some extent, with the position that through
the years of the conflict, Israel has been the victim while the Arabs
and the Palestinians are the perpetrators. 117 The construal of the out
group – the Palestinians - as ‘evil’ have always gone hand in hand
with the perception of the in-group - the Jewish Israelis - as victims. It
is within this social context that the Goldstone Mission was created,
and within which its fact-finding report was introduced.
B. Historical Background and the Creation of the Goldstone Mission
On December 27, 2008, Israeli Defense Forces started a twentytwo day attack on the Gaza Strip, known as Operation Cast Lead.
Israel described the attack as a response to constant rocket attacks
fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel’s southern cities, causing damage
and instilling great fear. By the operation’s end, both sides had
suffered casualties and damage. In the southern Israeli cities, rockets
and mortars damaged houses, schools, and cars; three Israeli civilians
114. Bar-Tal et al., supra note 101, at 79. See also THE LEVY COMMISSION REPORT ON
LEGAL STATUS OF BUILDING IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA 8 (2012) (determining that the
West Bank is not an occupied territory); David Kretzmer, Bombshell for the Settlement
Enterprise in the Levy Report, HAARETZ (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion
/bombshell-for-the-settlement-enterprise-in-levy-report-1.450170
[https://perma.cc/2SGHSA74] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
115. EPHRAIM YAAR & TAMAR HERMANN, WAR AND PEACE INDEX - JUNE 2009 2
(2009), http://www.peaceindex.org/files/peaceindex2009_6_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TX4WPLF] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
116. Bar-Tal et. al., supra note 101, at 82.
117. Daniel Bar-Tal et al., A Sense of Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood in
Intractable Conflicts, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 229 (2009),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-874-bartal-chernyakhai-schori-gundar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3WA-XWGA] (archived Jan. 19, 2018) (“about 40.6% of respondents
highly agreed or agreed with the statement that, ‘Throughout all the years of conflict, Israel
has been the victim and the Arabs and the Palestinians are the side causing harm’, and an
additional o.8% somewhat agreed with it.”).
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were killed and more than a thousand were injured. 118 On the
Palestinian side, the outcome of this war was much more devastating:
public buildings were destroyed, thousands civilians lost their homes,
many were injured, and about 1,400 were killed. 119
While the ongoing hostilities continued, the UN Human Rights
Council issued an urgent resolution, strongly condemning Israel for
its “massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian
people,” 120 and calling for an urgent international action “to put an
immediate end to the grave violations committed by the occupying
Power, Israel.” 121 Along with these and other condemnations, the
council also established an international fact-finding mission to
“investigate all violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel,
against the Palestinian people.” 122 The President of the Council was
authorized to appoint the mission’s members.
Almost three months later, on April 3, 2009, the President of the
Human Rights Council, Nigerian ambassador Martin Ihoeghian
Uhomoibhi, appointed Justice Richard Goldstone to lead the
mission. 123 Justice Goldstone insisted upon an equal and unbiased
mandate, however, and the mission’s mandate was changed at his
request. The final resolution authorized the mission “to investigate all
violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the
context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during
the period from December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009, whether
before, during or after.” 124
118. The Goldstone Report, supra note 5 at 31.
119. Israel claims that 1,166 Palestinians lost their lives, of which 706 are ‘unlawful
combatants.’ The Gaza authorities claim that the number of casualties is 1,444, and the
Goldstone mission found that the correct number varies between 1,387 to 1,417, without
distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Id. at 90-91.
120. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-9/L.1 (Jan. 12, 2009),
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/404E93E166533F828525754E00559E30
[https://perma.cc/R47N-LPJP] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3.
123. The Three other members that were appointed are: Prof. Christine Chinkin from the
United Kingdom, Hina Jilani from Pakistan, and Colonel Desmond Travers from Ireland. See
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC
/SpecialSessions/Session9/Pages/FactFindingMission.aspx
[https://perma.cc/FV9H-M8Q8]
(archived Dec. 31, 2017).
124. The Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 13.
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To fulfill its duties, the Goldstone Mission conducted 188
individual interviews. It reviewed more than 300 reports,
submissions, and other documentation, amounting to more than
10,000 pages, as well as over thirty videos and 1,200 photographs.125
The methodology was based on international investigative standards
developed by the United Nations. 126 While the Palestinian authority
and various human rights organizations fully cooperated with the
Mission, the State of Israel chose not to participate in the proceedings,
refused to surrender evidence or witnesses to the Mission, and
declined the Mission’s requests to get access to either Israeli territory
or the West Bank.
The Report specifies that credibility determinations concerning
the evidence collected were based on interpersonal impression of the
witnesses that appeared before the Mission; on verification of the
sources and the methodology used in the reports and documents
produced by others; on cross-referencing the relevant material and
information; and on a determination of whether, considering all the
circumstances, there was sufficient credible and reliable information
for the Mission to make a finding. 127 Based on the abovementioned
sources of information, in almost all of the investigated instances the
Mission determined not only the factual findings, but also the
corresponding legal findings (whether the acts described constitute
international crimes). 128 Finally, on September 15, 2009, the Mission
issued its comprehensive report, concluding that some of the actions
of the Government of Israel and of the Palestinian armed groups
constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity. 129
C. The Immediate Aftermath of the Release of the Goldstone Report
Following the release of the Goldstone Report, “the Israeli
Military conducted some 400 command investigations in relation to
Operation Cast Lead.” 130 Based on these, the Israeli Military
Advocate General has opened 52 criminal investigations into
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 284, 417-19.
130. Rep. of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law Established Pursuant to Council Resolution 13/9, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/24, at 6 (2011) [hereinafter Rep. of the Committee of Independent Experts].
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allegations of wrongdoing. 131 Of these 52 investigations, four cases
were submitted to prosecution, and three ended in convictions. 132 One
of these cases was a credit card theft case, and the accused soldier was
convicted and sentenced to a prison term of seven and a half
months. 133 In another case, two soldiers were convicted of “conduct
unbecoming” for forcing a 9-year-old Palestinian child to search bags
suspected of being booby trapped. They were demoted and received
suspended sentences of three months each. 134 Lastly, a soldier who
killed two Palestinian women holding a white flag reached a plea
bargain with the military prosecution, and pled guilty to “illegal use
of weapon” (the charge was reduced from “manslaughter”) and
“conduct unbecoming,” and was sentenced to 45 days imprisonment
and probation. 135
D. National Identity, Social Bias and the Goldstone Report
The release of the Goldstone Report sparked a new battle: this
time, between competing narratives, perceptions, and societal beliefs.
Instantly, Israel adopted a defensive attitude and blamed the Mission
for embracing a false, one-sided, and politically-biased viewpoint.
The Palestinians upheld the Report as supportive of their standpoint
(mostly ignoring the parts which accused Hamas of committing war
crimes and crimes against humanity). 136 Both sides entrenched
themselves in their positions, and ironically, the Report itself became
a part of the conflict. As Slater concluded, “the report has been so
relentlessly and bitterly attacked in Israel and the United States that it
has become toxic.” 137
Within Jewish-Israeli society, a peace-index public opinion poll
found that among those who were familiar with the Report’s main
findings, an overwhelming majority (93.5%) believed that the Report
was biased against the IDF. 138 Additionally, a large majority of 79%
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id., at 12.
134. 150/10 The Military prosecutor v. A. S. and G. S. [2010].
135. THOMAS SMITH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WAR THROUGH CIVILIAN EYES 137 (2017).
136. See, e.g., Barak Ravid, Natasha Mozgovaya & Reuters, Hamas: Goldstone Retreat
Doesn’t Negate War Crimes Committed in Gaza, HAARETZ (Apr. 3, 2011),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/hamas-goldstone-retreat-doesn-t-negate-war-crimescommitted-in-gaza-1.353716 [https://perma.cc/R6LC-KN8L] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
137. Slater, supra note 10, at 360.
138. YAAR ET. AL., supra note 7, at 1.
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rejected the Goldstone Report’s finding that during Operation Cast
Lead the IDF committed war crimes, and considered it to be false.139
In the Israeli Arab public only 5% rejected this finding. 140 A majority
of the Jewish public (64%) further discounted the testimonies of IDF
soldiers who participated in Operation Cast Lead and who provided
the Goldstone Mission with first-hand information concerning their
experiences. 141 Thus, the Jewish-Israelis discredited not only the
Goldstone Mission, but also anyone who cooperated with it, including
their own soldiers.
The rejection of the Goldstone Report’s main findings was
further strengthened by statements from senior Government officials
who contested the Report and its findings. For example, Defense
Minister, Ehud Barak, accused the Report of being “distorted, false,
and irresponsible” 142 and reaffirmed the core societal belief that “the
IDF is the most moral army in the world”; 143 Israel's president,
Shimon Peres, called Goldstone “a small man, devoid of any sense of
justice”; 144 and Finance Minister, Yuval Steinitz, attacked Justice
Goldstone Personally as an anti-Semite, and added that “we won’t let
Jews go again like lambs to the slaughter.” 145 Some Israelis put their
opposition to the Report into action by launching various legislative
initiatives to outlaw the activities of NGOs and individuals who
cooperated with the Goldstone Mission, and to condemn them as
traitors. In April 2010, for example, more than twenty Knesset
members submitted a bill forbidding the registration of any voluntary
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. EPHRAIM YAAR & TAMAR HERMANN, WAR AND PEACE INDEX - MARCH 2009 2
(2009), http://peaceindex.org/files/peaceindex2009_3_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JM4-C2D9]
(archived Jan. 19, 2018).
142. Barak: Goldstone Report False, Distorted, and Irresponsible, HAARETZ (Jan. 28,
2010), https://www.haaretz.com/news/barak-goldstone-report-false-distorted-and-irresponsible
-1.265821 [https://perma.cc/P2FA-7YYK] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
143. Ronen Medzini, Barak: No Doubt IDF is Most Moral Army in the World, YNET
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3692383,00.html
[https://perma.cc/LGC3-Q4UV] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). See also Finance Minister: UN
Backing of Goldstone Report is Anti-Semitic, HAARETZ, (Oct. 18, 2009),
https://www.haaretz.com/news/finance-minister-un-backing-of-goldstone-report-is-antisemitic-1.5909 [https://perma.cc/KW49-UWTD] (archived Dec. 31, 2017) [hereinafter UN
Backing of Goldstone Report].
144. Chris McGreal, Goldstone Family Drawn into Raw Over Gaza Report, THE
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/30/richardgoldstone-south-africa-jews [https://perma.cc/PRM9-9TMC] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
145. UN Backing of Goldstone Report, supra note 142.
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association reasonably believed to be involved in war crime lawsuits
abroad against Israeli politicians or army officers, or to have supplied
information to foreign bodies regarding such lawsuits. This bill would
have applied to the transmission of such information whether true or
false, and was initiated directly in response to the Goldstone
Report. 146 Elaborating on the various responses in Israeli society to
the Goldstone Report, Sheizaf concluded that the Report itself became
a symbol of identity and social affiliation: “Reject it, and you are with
us; listen to it, acknowledge it, and you are against us.” 147
Applying the theoretical framework summarized above to the
Jewish-Israeli society’s response to the Goldstone Report
demonstrates the impact of legal categorizations on dissemination of
information concerning controversial wartime events. The Goldstone
Report introduced its factual findings by categorizing them into “war
crimes” and “crimes against humanity” legal categories: some of the
most heinous crimes known to mankind, representing both legal and
moral blame. 148 By doing so, the Goldstone Report threatened core
societal beliefs within the Jewish-Israeli community, including the
deeply rooted belief that “the IDF is the most moral army in the
world.” 149 Consistent with the Jewish-Israeli narrative, which includes
a positive self-image and strong victimization belief, 150 the popular
Israeli perception of Operation Cast Lead saw the Israeli society as a
victim while Hamas and the Palestinian leadership had ‘forced’
Israelis to kill Palestinians. 151 Moreover, victimization beliefs in the
Jewish-Israeli society extended beyond the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, to the perception of Israel as a victim of a hostile world
which includes the Western states and international organizations
such as the United Nations. 152 These views reflect the wellentrenched ‘siege mentality’ that characterizes the Jewish-Israeli
146. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Shiri Krebs, From Illiberal Legislation to Intolerant
Democracy, 26 ISR. STUD. REV. 4 (2011).
147. Noam Sheizaf, Israel’s Siege Mentality, in THE GOLDSTONE REPORT supra note 81,
at 407.
148. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 105; Smith, supra note 105.
149. Neta Oren, Rafi Nets-Zehngut, & Daniel Bar-Tal, Construction of the IsraeliJewish-Conflict: Supportive Narrative and the Struggle Over its Dominance, 36 POL.
PSYCHOL. 215, 219 (2015); Medzini, supra note 143.
150. Bar-Tal, supra note 58, at 32.
151. Noa Schori-Eyal, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal, Three Layers of Collective
Victimhood: Effects of Multileveled Victimhood on Intergroup Conflicts in the Israeli–Arab
Context, 44 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 778, 781-782 (2014).
152. Bar-Tal et al., supra note 101, at 84.
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society. 153 By finding that “some of the actions of the Government of
Israel might justify a competent court finding that crimes against
humanity have been committed,” 154 the Goldstone Report threatened
core societal beliefs engrained within the Jewish-Israeli society,
resulting in a complete rejection of this information as false and
biased. 155
V. REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING
The Goldstone Mission was designed and established by a
political body - the UN Human Rights Council - to investigate
violations of international law. Its initial mandate was one-sided, and
its authorizing resolution had already condemned Israel for
committing the violations it was set to investigate. This flawed
process shadowed the work of the Mission from the start, and
frustrated the possibility of Israeli cooperation. As a result, the
Mission had very limited access to significant information necessary
to establish legal conclusions. Nonetheless, the Mission followed
through with its focus on legal categorization, and adopted the
methodology, terminology, and structure of legal adjudication. At the
same time, the Mission did not adopt the burden of proof required in
criminal proceedings (in fact, it is unclear what burden of proof was
adopted by the Mission). The focus on legal accountability - without
the tools required to establish it - created a meaningful gap between
the mission’s mandate, goals, processes, and its potential outcomes.
The following Sections strive to reimagine the design process for
international fact-finding missions, with a focus on their goals,
processes, and structures.

153. Two thousand years of Diaspora is viewed as one long period of persecution, with
the climax of the Holocaust as a national trauma, leaving their marks on the collective psyche.
Id. at 85.
154. The Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 26.
155. As Cohen points out, international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
almost always been seen by the international intervener as an act of humanitarian assistance,
and is always perceived by one or both of the main parties as a coercive imposition of external
will. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 244.
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A. Prioritizing Fact-Finding Goals and Purposes
1. Immediate Goal: Finding the Truth
The most basic, immediate, goal of any fact-finding mechanism
is to ascertain facts. Nonetheless, the desire to find the truth
necessitates making various choices and determinations, as the
concept of truth has different meanings. The South African TRC, for
example, developed and promoted four different aspects of truth: a
forensic truth, focused on the objective information; a narrative truth,
focused on the personal stories and experiences of individuals - both
victims and perpetrators - and on creation of a united, restored
memories; a social truth, established through interaction, discussion
and debate; and a healing/restorative truth, enabled through public
acknowledgment and common memories of the events.156
Understanding, analyzing and highlighting these various aspects of
truth enabled the commission to reconcile its main two goals - truth
and reconciliation - and to strive to achieve them both.
In contrast, the Goldstone Mission - similarly to many
international fact-finding missions - focused on legal truth – ‘the truth
in the eyes of the law’ 157 or the legal interpretation and meaning of
certain physical facts. 158 As the dynamics which followed the release
of the Goldstone Report demonstrate, the adoption of contentious
legal categories may have contributed to the wave of backlash and
denial (due to both the insufficiency of the evidence to make
conclusive legal determinations, and the threat these legal categories
posed to national narratives and identities). Captured in their national
narrative and threatened by harsh accusations that invalidate core
societal beliefs, the Jewish-Israeli society rejected the findings of the
Goldstone Report and entrenched in its victimization belief.
The attribution of legal fault and blame shifted attention towards
debates over the legal interpretation of the facts, instead of focusing
on the brute facts (such as numbers of casualties and magnitude of
destruction) or on individual victims and their narratives. It missed an
opportunity to infuse the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with more
nuanced perceptions. Any solution to this intractable, violent, conflict
156. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH
THE MORALITY OF THE TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141, 151-153 (Robert I. Rotberg &
Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
157. Balkin, supra note 15, at, 6.
158. Moore, supra note 15, at 25.
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will have to include some sort of co-existence, of living together and
of overcoming demonization and de-humanization processes. The two
nations - the Israeli nation and the Palestinian nation - share territory
and recourses, past and future. Unfortunately, they do not share the
same interpretation of history and the same account of important
events; on the contrary - their national narratives and identities
exclude one another. Under these circumstances, rigid legal categories
may not be the best form of fact-finding, as they may strengthen
social biases and trigger denial and rejection. To be sure, any factfinding effort in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian context is likely
to encounter resistance. Nonetheless, linking brute facts to threatening
legal accusations is more likely to generate strong rejection.
Importantly, facts matter. They have meaning outside the familiar
legal categories. And this meaning should not be undermined or
ignored by fact-finding bodies.
Taking in mind the socio-psychological dynamics described
above, of distortion or rejection of threatening information, the
Goldstone Mission may have benefited from considering broader,
more inclusive aspects of truth. 159 The adversarial legal truth (which
leads to binary dichotomies, such as ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’), could
have been replaced, for example, with forensic truth, allowing to
focus (and perhaps agree) on the brute facts, or with narrative truth,
allowing for the coexistence of various narratives and perspectives.
Such an approach may encourage public acknowledgment of the
events, as well as the creation and promotion of a shared narrative. 160
By rethinking their commitment to legal categories and legal
interpretation, fact-finding mechanisms may be able to dismantle
some of the threat and distortion, and be better equipped to
disseminate information.

159. Marco Sassoli, for example, called the international community not to use
international criminal law as an alibi for not engaging in cooperative and diplomatic efforts to
resolve the conflict itself. Marco Sassoli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian
Law: Current and Inherent Challenges, 10 Y.B. INT’L. HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 55 (2007).
160. Similarly, the medical and psychological literature already revealed the potential
contribution of this broader understanding of truth for therapy. See generally Alan W. Schefin,
Narrative Truth, Historical Truth, and Forensic Truth, in THE MENTAL HEALTH
PRACTITIONER AND THE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK (Lawrence E. Lifson & Robert
I. Simon eds., 1998).
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2. Long Term Goals: Accountability versus Conflict Resolution
While truth is usually the immediate goal of fact-finding, many
times it is employed as a tool to achieve other, long-term, goals. Such
goals include creating a historical record, encouraging domestic
accountability, fostering reconciliation, and preventing future
abuses. 161 To develop suitable fact-finding processes that can
maximize the efficacy of a fact-finding mission in relation to its goals,
and to better evaluate its outcomes, the institutional goals of an
international fact-finding mission should be organized and prioritized
carefully. 162 Unfortunately, the concrete goals of many fact-finding
missions are not clearly defined or prioritized.
Moreover, even when goals are mentioned in the mandating
process they are often mixed, sometimes conflicting, as the
fulfillment of some of these goals may impede the achievement of
others. Such tension exists between the desire to promote
accountability by conducting criminal trials, and the struggle for a
peaceful change of regime; 163 another tension exists between justice
and truth, as the criminal legal process limits the permissible
evidence. 164 The documents concerning the United Nations
Independent Investigation on Burundi (“UNIIB”), for example,
mention several goals and purposes for the investigation, including
161. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 46 (arguing that the goal of international factfinding is accountability). Others describe a multiplicity of interconnected goals, and
emphasize the importance of fact-finding to establishing when certain allegations of IHL and
human rights violations were unfounded and did not occur, and to undermining exaggerated
stories or myths that, if not questioned, fuel resentment and perpetuate the cycle of violence
between communities. Boutruche, supra note 21, at 36. For an expansive elaboration on the
various possible goals of any dispute resolution system, see Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez,
An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 130
(2009).
162. Drawing on the work of the influential sociologist Charles Perrow, Yuval Shany
offered an analytical framework to organize and prioritize the institutional goals of
international tribunals, by distinguishing between official and operational goals, and by
analyzing the goals’ source (external or internal), hierarchical level (ultimate ends or
intermediate), and method or articulation (explicit, implicit, or unstated). See Yuval Shany,
Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L
L. 225, 232, 270 (2012).
163. Which can sometime be achieved only by promising powerful dictators full
amnesties. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and
Transitional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289, 292 (2009).
164. Moreover, the ICTY was criticized for fueling the Serb population’s antagonism
and for failing to create a common and accepted account of the war’s history. See Patricia M.
Wald, ICTY Judicial Proceedings - An Appraisal from Within, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 466, 467
(2004).
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‘preventing further deterioration of the human rights situation,’
making recommendations ‘on the improvement of the human rights
situation’ in Burundi, assisting reconciliation efforts, ensuring
‘accountability for human rights violations and abuses, including by
identifying alleged perpetrators,’ adopting ‘appropriate transitional
justice measures,’ and issuing a final report and participating in an
enhanced interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in
Burundi. 165 While all of these goals are valuable and important, it
seems unlikely that a fact-finding mission could accomplish them all
at the same time, relying on a single structure. A tension exists, for
example, between the desire to promote accountability by identifying
and prosecuting responsible individuals and the desire to prevent
future abuses and to promote reconciliation, which can sometimes be
achieved by promising powerful leaders full or partial amnesty. 166
Therefore, it is important to prioritize the goals of fact-finding
efforts, and to choose between long-term normative goals, such as
justice or accountability, and pragmatic objectives such as stopping
the violence or managing (or even resolving) the conflict. 167 Taking in
mind the complexity of some conflicts, international fact-finding
missions should not be limited to goals of adjudication and
accountability. While international criminal tribunals ought to be
supported by certain fact-finding mechanisms, not all international
fact-finding mechanisms should be designed in their shadow. This is
especially true with regard to ongoing violent conflicts, such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can benefit from efforts to infuse
the conflict with new perspectives and information. Sociopsychological research has thus far demonstrated that third parties such as international fact-finding mechanisms - can potentially play a
valuable role in the process of re-evaluating social narratives and
beliefs. 168
165. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. S-24/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-24/1 (Dec.
17, 2015).
166. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, supra note 161, at 291-92; see also Jane E.
Stromseth et al., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS 253 (2006).
167. In fact, this issue becomes much more complex, since the question of whether and
how accountability proceedings can contribute to strengthening domestic justice systems is
surprisingly under analyzed. See Stromseth et al., supra note 166, at 253.
168. Bar-Tal, supra note 58, at 43. Others found that third-party activities to open or
maintain lines of communication are the most consistently effective conflict management
techniques for preventing escalation. See William J. Dixon, Third-Party Techniques for
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3. Institutional goals: reputation, legitimacy, and compliance
The reputation of the fact-finding body is determined by its
perceived independence, impartiality, effectiveness and legitimacy.
This last indicator is especially important, as a fact-finding mission’s
ability to attain its goals largely depends on its perceived legitimacy
in the eyes of key constituencies. 169 Legitimacy is, fundamentally, a
collective process. It depends on apparent consensus among the
relevant actors, accepting the object - in our case, the fact-finding
mission - as legitimate. 170 In international justice thus far, the most
well-known structures - including fact-finding missions - have been
designed by international elite. 171 This top-down designing process
creates a dual legitimacy deficit: first, it distances the relevant
societies from the fact-finding body, and diminishes its capacity to
harness domestic institutions to promote its objectives and implement
its outputs. Second, it challenges the structural independence of the
fact-finding body, as it subjects the decision-making process to the
political agenda and balance of power of the international
community. 172 Therefore, while designing international fact-finding
bodies, it is important to think not only about the goals, processes and
structures, but also about the identity of the mandate provider and its
perceived or actual political ties.
The Goldstone Mission was established by the UN Human
Rights Council, an international body infamous for its political antiIsraeli agenda, which prompted both the former and the current UN
Secretary-Generals to strongly criticize the Council’s anti-Israeli
focus. 173 Moreover, the resolution establishing the Mission already
Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement, 50 INT’L ORG. 653, 671
(1996).
169. Shany, supra note 172, at 266.
170. Cathryn Johnson et al., Legitimacy as a Social Process, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 53, 57
(2006).
171. Schneider, supra note 162, at 297. This top-down design of the ICTY and ICTR, for
example, has led to a criticized distance of the tribunals - both geographically and
psychologically - from the relevant societies. See Stromseth et al., supra note 166, at 268, 271.
The same is also true with regard to truth commissions. The 1992 El-Salvadorian truth
commission did not initially gain public trust and support, partly because it was established
without public participation. Zinaida Miller, Settling with History: A Hybrid Commission of
Inquiry for Israel/Palestine, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 293, 316 (2007).
172. See Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 37.
173. Secretary-General Urges Human Rights Activists To ‘Fill Leadership Vacuum’,
Hold World Leaders to Account, in Address to International Day Event, U. N. Press Release,
SG/SM/10788-HR/4909-OBV/6018, (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/
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determined that Israel is responsible for massive violations against the
Palestinian people. 174 Similarly, the Mission’s mandate was severely
flawed, and had to be revised by Justice Goldstone himself. The
identity of the establishing institution, the initial one-sided mandate
and the language of the establishing resolution, created a significant
legitimacy deficit, at least in the eyes of the Jewish-Israeli society.
Consequently, it frustrated Israeli cooperation with the Mission, and
triggered bias towards its findings even before it embarked on its
mission.
What can be done to enhance the legitimacy of fact-finding
bodies – and thus improve the level of acceptance of their findings
and recommendations? In their book Trust in the Law, Taylor and
Huo find that acceptance of legal decisions increases when people
regard the agents of the legal system as acting in a way they perceive
to be fair and trustworthy. 175 In a study focused on police legitimacy,
Tyler demonstrates how perceived fairness of the institution’s
procedures influences evaluations of legitimacy. 176 He finds, that
when authorities act in ways that people experience as being fair,
people are more willing to voluntarily accept the authorities’
decisions. 177 Tylor makes several recommendations to increase the
procedural fairness – and legitimacy - of an organization: 178 first,
enhance participation - people are more satisfied with procedures that
allow them to participate by explaining their situations and
communicating their views. Participation is especially important for
international fact-finding institutions lacking binding force or
enforcement capabilities. To enhance participation, it is important to
first identify all of the relevant stakeholders, and to invite them to
sgsm10788.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/X8RC-HACS] (archived Dec. 31, 2017) (stating “I am
worried by its disproportionate focus on violations by Israel”); Secretary-General Urges
Human Rights Council to Take Responsibilities Seriously, Stresses Importance Of
Considering All Violations Equally, U.N. Press Release, SG/SM/11053-HRC/8, (June 20,
2007), http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sgsm11053.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/7V4L-XAC2]
(archived Dec. 31, 2017). See also John Shamran, UK puts UN Human Rights Council ‘on
notice’ over ‘anti-Israel bias’, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 25, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/uk-un-human-rights-council-on-notice-israel-bias-palestiniansettlement-a7649171.html [https://perma.cc/P3S4/NYV7] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
174. See supra Section IV.B.
175. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 7 (2002).
176. Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing police legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 84, 91 (2004).
177. Id.
178. Id., at 94-95.

2018]

DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING

375

participate in the process. 179 Second, after all potential participants
have been identified, one way to motivate them to participate is by
enhancing structural flexibility - the possibility of modifying factfinding structures or procedures in response to changing needs or
circumstances - and by offering a menu of processes and structures to
choose from, as different processes entail diverse incentives for the
relevant parties. 180 Third, objectivity - people think that decisions are
being more fairly made when authorities are unbiased and make their
decisions using objective indicators, not personal views. Fourth,
improve quality of interpersonal treatment - people value being
treated with dignity and respect by authorities. Fifth, trustworthiness people feel that procedures are fairer when they trust the motives of
decision makers.
Returning to the Goldstone Mission, legitimacy and legitimacyenhancing techniques were not factored into the design of the
Mission, nor did they influence its fact-finding structures and
processes later on. In fact, all five aspects identified by Taylor as
enhancing legitimacy were not considered by the UN Human Rights
Council, and ultimately contributed to the backlash against the
Mission’s findings. While this was consistent with its general
approach, which did not see the Jewish-Israeli society as its intended
audience, it nonetheless sustained the international controversy
concerning the Report and its findings.
First, with regard to participation - the legal focus required
access to information held by Israel. To make credible legal
conclusions, the Mission had to review information concerning
military decision-making processes, including the knowledge and
intent of the alleged perpetrators. Therefore, to achieve this goal,
methods to enhance participation should have been seriously and
creatively considered. To enhance the legitimacy of the fact-finding
mission and the facts it produces - given partial participation international fact-finding may benefit from focusing on non-legal
truth, as suggested above, while leaving the legal interpretation of the
179. As Miller points out, public participation, civil society cooperation and popular
support are crucial for the success of any truth commission. See Miller, supra note 169, at 316.
See also Susan Summers Raines, Perceptions of Legitimacy and Efficacy in International
Environmental Management Standards: The Impact of the Participation Gap, 3 GLOBAL
ENVTL. POL. 47, 72 (2003).
180. Smith & Martinez, supra note 159, at 131. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are
There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design - And What We Should [Not] Do About
It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009).
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facts to competent courts or tribunals which may be better equipped
to summon witnesses and collect evidence. By emphasizing the
importance of participation I do not suggest that a refusal to
participate in the fact-finding process should have frustrated any
attempt to establish the truth; but it is important to be aware of the
limitations that a participation gap imposes on the fact-finding
process. Second, with regard to structural flexibility - the Israeli
refusal to cooperate with the Mission should have prompt a discussion
of alternative processes that may be adopted instead, in an effort to
enhance the Mission’s legitimacy and thus increase the potential
impact of its findings. As with the discussion of the participation
element, structural flexibility would have required focusing on the
elements that were in the control of the Mission, such as recording
witness’ testimonies and focusing on brute facts. Third, the perceived
objectivity of the Mission by its Jewish-Israeli audience was doomed
from the start, in part, due to the politicized nature of its founding
body, the UNHCR. Consequently, the perceived bias of the founding
institution tainted the further elements of trustworthiness of the factfinders and their interpersonal skills, and turned the de-legitimation of
the Mission to a national task in Israel and a test of loyalty and social
belonging.
B. Matching goals with processes in international fact-finding
As discussed above, international fact-finding missions – as any
other international institution - may be established to fulfill an array
of goals and purposes. However, the structure and processes adopted
by international fact-finding missions in recent years have been quite
uniform, focusing on legal categories and legal violations framework
to collect, interpret and produce facts. A possible explanation for this
uniformity is that their mandates are often crafted hastily, while
atrocities are ongoing, without identifying and prioritizing concrete
goals. 181 A lack of clarity concerning the mission’s goals may
motivate the adoption of existing or familiar processes and structures,
without proper consideration of the appropriateness of these structures
to achieve the desired goals, or the existence of alternative structures.
Therefore, while designing international fact-finding missions,
the mandating institution should define, clarify, and prioritize the
goals and purposes of this mission. Based on the mission’s main
181. See H.R.C. Res. S-24/1, supra note 177.
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goals, alternative processes and structures should be considered,
matching goals to processes in order to maximize the mission’s
efficacy. Instead of adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach,
international fact-finding would benefit from careful consideration of
alternative processes and structures, and from a learned process of
tailoring concrete processes and structures to specific goals.
The analysis of the Goldstone Mission suggests that a mismatch
existed between the main goal of the Mission – investigating
violations of international law – and the structure of the Mission,
which had no enforcement capabilities and had to rely on voluntary
cooperation from the relevant stakeholders to get access to
information. No cooperation meant partial data, and partial data
meant legal findings that rest upon unsatisfactory evidence. One
particular example from the Goldstone Report demonstrates the
implications of this mismatch between goals and processes.
One of the incidents the Goldstone Report focused on was the
shelling of the Al-Samouni family house. The Report determined,
based on testimonies by family members and eyewitnesses, that on
January 5, 2009, around 6:30-7:00 a.m., Israeli forces fired several
projectiles at the Al-Samouni family house, located at Zeytoun area,
south of Gaza city. The first two projectiles were fired at five men
who stepped outside to bring firewood. Immediately after this initial
attack, additional projectiles destroyed the house, were dozens of
unarmed civilians took shelter, under explicit orders from IDF
soldiers (who denied their pleas to leave the area and ordered them
back into the house). As a result of the shelling, twenty-one family
members were killed, and nineteen were injured. 182
Israel refused to cooperate with the Mission and did not provide
any information concerning its military operations. Therefore, the
Goldstone Mission did not have evidence concerning the military
decision-making process, the reasons for the shelling, and the
knowledge and intent of those who ordered the attack. Nonetheless,
the Mission did not stop here, with the factual findings concerning
this incident, and moved on to determine the legal categories for these
actions. The Mission members found that the attack on the AlSamouni house was “a direct intentional attack against civilian
population” which may constitute a crime against humanity. 183
182. The Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 161-62.
183. Id. at 182-83, 284.
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In response, Israeli military authorities rejected this description
altogether. A military investigation opened following the release of
the Goldstone Report found that the brigade commander’s order to
bomb the Al-Samouni house was based on erroneous – yet legitimate
– interpretation of drone photos shown in the war room, in which the
men holding firewood seemed as terrorists holding RPG rockets. 184 In
May 2012, the military prosecution announced that no legal steps will
be taken against those responsible for the shelling of the Al-Samouni
house, 185 as the killing of the Al-Samouni family members was not
done knowingly and directly, or out of haste and negligence, in a
manner that would indicate criminal responsibility. 186 In between,
while the Israeli military investigation was still ongoing, Justice
Richard Goldstone published an op-ed in the Washington Post, in
which he specifically retracted from the Goldstone Report’s legal
findings concerning the Al-Samouni incident. In his op-ed, Justice
Goldstone stated that the shelling of the Al-Samouni home “was
apparently the consequence of an Israeli commander’s erroneous
interpretation of a drone image,” and that “if I had known then what I
know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different
document.”187 Goldstone’s op-ed was vindicated by Israel as a proof
that the Goldstone Report – including its factual findings – was biased
and false, and that the IDF operates according to international law
generally, and particularly in the shelling of the Al-Samouni house. 188
The Al-Samouni controversy demonstrates the importance of
adopting fact-finding processes and structures that are consistent with
184. ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GAZA OPERATION INVESTIGATIONS: SECOND
UPDATE 6 (2010),
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents
/GazaUpdateJuly2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/93WU-3678] (archived Jan. 19, 2018); Amira
Hass, What Led to IDF Bombing House Full of Civilians During Gaza War?, HAARETZ (Oct.
24,
2010),
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/what-led-to-idf-bombing-house-full-ofcivilians-during-gaza-war-1.320816 [https://perma.cc/Y65P-HXM2] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
185. Amira Hass, IDF Closes Probe Into Israeli Air Strike That Killed 21 Members of
Gaza Family, HAARETZ (May 1, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/idf-closes-probeinto-israeli-air-strike-that-killed-21-members-of-gaza-family-1.427583
[https://perma.cc/LSM6-G5SM] (archived Dec. 31, 2017).
186. Id.
187. Richard Goldstone, Opinion, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and
War Crimes, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC
_story.html?utm_term=.597a7cb64bb9 [https://perma.cc/6RLB-TU3U] (archived Dec. 31,
2017).
188. ISRAELI DEF. FORCES, STRATEGIC DIV., THE GOLDSTONE REPORT: JUDGE
RICHARD GOLDSTONE REVISES HIS POSITION (Apr. 5, 2011).
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the main goal of the fact-finding institution. The legal categorization
approach adopted by the Goldstone Mission is suitable for advancing
legal accountability goals, but must rest on fact-finding processes that
provide the evidence necessary to make legal conclusions. In the
Goldstone Mission’s case, without guaranteeing Israel’s cooperation
or external enforcement capacities that would result in gathering the
required evidence, the legal conclusions rested on insufficient
evidence. As a result, even Goldstone himself later retracted from the
legal conclusions determined by the Report, in a way that robbed the
brute facts from their independent meaning and significance. Israeli
military did shell a house where numerous people, including infants,
children, and elderly, took shelter. As a result, twenty-one family
members were killed and many others injured. These facts should
have been at the center of attention. Instead, the focus on binary legal
categories turned the accusations on their head, reasserting that the
IDF is indeed the most moral army in the world. The insufficiency of
the evidence for attributing legal blame and responsibility projected
on the factual findings as well – even though these were based on
appropriate evidence. Goldstone apologized to Israel over the opinion
pages of the Washington Post. Who will apologize to the Al-Samouni
survivors?
VI. CONCLUSION
Through the glasses of Israeli national identity, Operation Cast
Lead was nothing but a justified and necessary reaction to monstrous
Palestinian terrorism. In contrast, the Goldstone Report accused Israel
with committing atrocious international crimes against innocent
civilians. The Report’s focus on binary legal categories intensified
Israelis’ defensive response aimed at protecting and preserving their
national narrative. At the same time, it shifted attention from the brute
facts - the sounds and images, the voices and faces, the dust, ruins,
hunger, blood and tears - to sophisticated and abstract debates over
legal interpretations and definitions.
Truth is comprised of various layers of information and is
subjected to different social perceptions and interpretations. During
armed conflicts, many factors join-in to escalate conflicting
assessments of “what really happened.” Information that threatens
core societal beliefs triggers defensive reactions and might be
distorted to fit the national narrative. This socio-psychological
dynamic presents a unique challenge to the dissemination of
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international fact-finding reports during intractable armed conflicts. In
order to overcome this challenge and to improve the positive effects
of international fact-finding efforts, fact-finding missions should be
carefully and thoughtfully designed.
First, the mechanism’s goals should be clearly defined and
prioritized. The immediate goal of finding the truth and determining
‘what really happened’ should not be jeopardized by or secondary to
long terms goals such as accountability or reconciliation. With regard
to long-term goals, the traditional goal of accountability should not
overshadow other important goals, such as conflict resolution and
reconciliation. This is especially true with regard to intractable armed
conflicts, which can benefit from efforts to infuse the conflict with
new dynamics, perspectives and information. Additionally,
institutional goals, such as legitimacy, trust and participation, should
also be considered and enhanced in order to improve their positive
impact and mitigate backlash and resistance. Once its main goal is
clearly defined, fact-finding processes could – and should - be
tailored to the concrete goal of the fact-finding mission. The
enforcement deficit of some fact-finding mechanisms, such as the
Goldstone Mission, requires processes that highlight participation and
cooperation.
Second, adversarial legal truth should not dominate international
fact-finding efforts. Legal truth is not the only truth, and legal blame
may be counterproductive when it comes to preventing future
atrocities and mobilizing institutional change within inflexible
military organizations. There are other types of knowledge, which
may be less threatening than legal truth, and more sensitive to the
nuances of complex situations. By relinquishing legal categorization
and interpretation of facts, along with its inherent attribution of blame
and fault, fact-finding missions may be able to dismantle some the
threat and distortion, and thus improve the dissemination of their
findings by the conflicting groups.
Finally, in this era of constant challenges to knowledge and
information, where ‘alternative facts’ are frequently produced to
counter unwelcomed information, and when critical findings are
denounced as ‘fake news’, the outputs of international fact-fining
missions are particularly sensitive to competing findings. Therefore,
international fact-finding missions should be sensitive to the various
contingencies of their findings, and adopt a humbler approach
concerning the ‘indisputable’ nature of these findings. Instead of
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serving as a cheap substitute (politically and financially) to
international adjudication, fact-finding missions may creatively
contribute to dissemination of threatening information during
intractable conflicts in a way that is unattainable by existing legal
institutions. If designed thoughtfully, international fact-finding
missions may encourage conflicting societies to re-evaluate some of
their core societal beliefs, and accept new information concerning the
conflict, their adversaries and perhaps even their own actions.
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